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Oral Will Contracts and the Statute of
Frauds in California, 1896-1980: A
Summary and Evaluation
MARC P. BOURET*
There is no longer any certainty that one can successfully argue that
purely oral mutual promises to bequeath property are unenforceable due
to the Statute of Frauds. The author traces the trends in the oral will con-
tract area during the past eighty years. He then analyzes various excep-
tions to the Statute of Frauds which have developed to allow oral will
contracts to be enforced during the lifetime of the promisor, or more fre-
quently after his or her death.
This article evaluates and summarizes the California position
on oral will contracts during the last eighty years.' The prolifera-
tion of decisions during this period has served to create a seam-
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1. This article is confined to the California position on this subject, except for
historical discussions of sister states and English law. The breadth of material
written on this subject in California is sparse at best, but its controversy in the
general field of contracts has been widely discussed. See generally B. SPARKS,
CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS (1956); 4 W. PAGE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS,
§§ 1707-62 (1941); 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS, § 10.1-10.50
(1961).
less web of case law interpretations. The principal focus2 will be
on the statutes and their judicially imposed exceptions which cir-
cumvent the Statute of Frauds in oral agreements to make a will
or to devise property.3
In California, agreements to leave property by will have often
consisted of a testator's promise to devise property if he receives
personal or lifetime services in return or other consideration. 4
The plethora of cases involve situations that occur when a dece-
dent fails to do what he promised, and therefore, the contract
must be judicially enforced.5 The contracts involved in such cases
are of questionable validity when confronted with the California
Statute of Frauds.6
California courts uphold the validity of oral will contracts upon
the satisfaction of two elements. First, a contract must be evident
to insure adequate consideration and definitive terms.7 Second, a
memorandum of the alleged oral agreement is required,8 or a part
performance,9 sufficient unconscionable injury,'0 and detrimental
reliance can substitute for the memorandum. 1 California courts
2. This topic necessarily encompasses the subject popularly known as recip-
rocal, joint or mutual wills, but concentrates particularly on the facts that arise
upon an oral promise made by one person to leave property in a certain manner
and the reliance on that promise by a second party. Joint wills involve the situa-
tion where a like instrument is adopted as the will of two persons and is signed by
both parties. Such a will may be probated at the respective deaths of each of the
persons. G. THOMPSON, LAW OF WIuLS § 34 (2d ed. 1936); 1 A. MARSHALL, CALIFOR-
NIA PROBATE PROCEDURE § 610 (4th ed. 1979). Mutual or reciprocal wills have iden-
tical provisions and are commonly found where separate wills are made by two
persons that have identical provisions. See G. THOMPSON, LAw OF Win.S § 34 (3d
ed. 1947).
3. Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 84, 87, 193 P. 84, 86, 87 (1920).
4. See Kassianov v. Raissis, 200 Cal. App. 2d 573, 576, 19 Cal. Rptr. 614, 616
(1962) (an oral agreement was made to care for a person for that person's life and
to bury him).
5. At times, the opposite result is reached and no contract is formed. See
Wood v. Wrigley, 119 Cal. App. 2d 90, 97, 258 P.2d 1049, 1054 (1953).
6. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624(6) (West 1973); Palmer v. Phillips, 123 Cal. App. 2d
291, 295, 266 P.2d 850, 853 (1954).
7. Smith v. Smith, 126 Cal. App. 2d 194, 196-97, 272 P.2d 118, 120 (1954) (action
on oral agreement to leave property to plaintiff in consideration of services to be
rendered and in quantum meruit; suit instituted against the executor of the estate
of one of the promisors).
8. The lack of a memorandum is not fatal if other facts sufficiently establish
the contract. Drvol v. Bant, 183 Cal. App. 2d 351, 357, 7 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1960).
9. Rundell v. McDonald, 62 Cal. App. 721, 724-25, 217 P. 1082, 1084 (1923).
10. See e.g., Jirschik v. Farmers & Mercn. Nat'l Bank, 107 Cal. App. 405, 406-07,
237 P.2d 49, 50 (1951) (recovery for unconscionable injury was denied because of
an estoppel defense; plaintiff was employed and paid by decedent at a lower rate
than she could have made elsewhere; she stayed at decedent's house upon a
promise to receive property by will).
11. Porporato v. Devincenzi, 261 Cal. App. 2d 670, 674, 678, 68 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213,
214-15 (1968) (action for quasi-specific contract to enforce the oral agreement of a
father-in-law to leave property to Porporato in exchange for her personal services.
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utilizing this approach during the last eighty years have obliter-
ated the effectiveness of the Statute of Frauds which would pre-
vent a binding agreement from being concluded before execution
of formal written agreements.12 Today the scale of equity has
shifted to allow enforcement of more oral contracts than at any
other time.' 3
The purpose of this article is to sort out the debris and myths
left after almost a century of opinions in this area by evaluating a
few key decisions. The discussion will commence with a treat-
ment of the historical development in California of oral will con-
tracts in light of the Statute of Frauds.14 Analysis will be directed
toward court decisions which circumvent the Statute of Frauds by
using the theories of equitable estoppel,15 part performance16 and
detrimental reliance.' 7 As a result of these judicially crafted ex-
ceptions, the statute has been literally shotgunned with loop-
holes.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP TO THE PAROL WILL CONTRACT
The original statute was born over three centuries ago under a
variety of policy reasons. In 1676, the English Parliament enacted
the Statute of Frauds.18 The statute emphasized the necessity of
written evidence of an agreement. The purpose of the statute was
Porporato, in reliance on the agreement, returned to San Francisco, where they
were living and raised the grandchildren).
12. See generally Sparks, Legal Effects of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath
Prior to the Death of the Promisor. I, 53 MICH. L REV. 1 (1954); Comment, Equita-
ble Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CAUIF. L. REV. 590 (1965);
Note, Part Performance, Estoppel and the California Statute of Frauds, 3 STAN. L
REV. 281 (1951); Note, Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit
of Third Parties, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 423 (1967).
13. This trend will be discussed; see notes 172-82, 213-16, 218-20, infra and ac-
companying text.
14. One commentator has questioned the validity of the exact year in which
the Statute of Frauds was enacted, and the identity of the author. Note, The Date
and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARv. L. REV. 329 (1912). However, for
the purposes of this comment, the date 1676 shall be assumed correct. W. BURBY,
REAL PROPERTY 287 (3d ed. 1965).
15. See generally, Note, S/F: The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Stat-
ute of Frauds, 66 MICH. L. REV. 170 (1967); Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Ap-
plied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 440 (1931).
16. See note 12 supra.
17. Note, Promissory Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 114 (1975).
18. See C. BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS 1-23 (1880); 1 H. REED, LAW OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 1-25 (1884). The law was known as a statute for the prevention
of frauds and perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 16 (1676).
to prevent the establishment of dishonest contract claims.19 Dur-
ing the three centuries since Parliament's enactment of the Stat-
ute of Frauds, the courts have strained to find methods to avoid
the harshness of the requirement of a writing.20 In California,
this judicial inclination to chomp at the statutory bit has been
manifested by the application of numerous exceptions to the codi-
fied rule.2 1 Some courts have enforced the policy of the statute
and have reflected concern for the potential danger of easing the
general requirement for a writing.22 On the other hand, some
courts have applied exceptions that encroach upon the statute.
23
California's first Statute of Frauds was enacted on April 19,
1850.24 The original Act required a writing for leasing property for
longer than one year or for the sale of land.25 All agreements had
to be in writing and had to be capable of performance within one
year.26 This first statute did not deal with oral agreements to de-
vise or bequeath property and left the matter open. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court had occasion to confront the issue forty-six
years later.27
The modern California version of the Statute of Frauds was en-
acted in 1872 as section 1624 of the California Civil Code.28 The
statute has been amended at various times since its enactment,
but not until 1905, did the legislature make the statute applicable
to will contracts.29 Presently, the statute provides in relevant
part:
The following contracts are invalid unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged or by his agent:
19. 3 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 448 (3d ed. 1960).
20. See generally, Note, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 CoLumr. L REV. 273,
273-74 (1916).
21. See generally, 35 CAL. JuR. 3D, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, of, §§ 89-118 (Supp.
1979). See note 180 infra.
22. See e.g., Kessler v. Lauretz, 39 Cal. App. 3d 441, 449, 114 Cal. Rptr. 42, 44
(1974); State v. Haslett Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 252, 256, 119 Cal. Rptr. 78, 80 (1975).
23. Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314, 318, 95 P. 159, 160 (1908); Taylor v. Odell, 50
Cal. App. 2d 115, 125, 122 P.2d 919, 924 (1942).
24. 1850 Cal. Stats. 226 codified in CAL. CIV. CODE: §§ 3152-3154, 3156-3158, 3163
(Hittel's 1865). See also 1 M. THROOP, VALIDrry OF VERBAL AGREEMENTS 36-37
(1870).
25. 1850 Cal. Stats. 266, 267 (codified in CAL. CrV. CODE § 3152).
26. Id. at 267.
27. Schaadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. App. 715, 84 P. 249 (1906). The first
reported decision of the California Courts of Appeal to address the issue that is
the subject of this article is Schaadt. On November 8, 1904, the courts of appeal
were created.
28. 1873-74 Cal. Amend. Code 241.
29. Id.; 1877-78 Cal. Amend. Code 86; 1905 Cal. Stats. 610; 1931 Cal. Stats. 2260;
1937 Cal. Stats. 695; 1963 Cal. Stats. 1843; 1967 Cal. Stats. 953. The code was made
applicable to will contracts pursuant to 1905 Cal. Stats. 610.
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(6) An agreement which by its terms is not to be performed during the
lifetime of the promisor, or an agreement to devise or bequeath any prop-
erty, or to make any provision for any person by will.
3 0
Subsection 6 requires that an agreement to devise or bequeath
must be in writing or supported by some note or memorandum
signed by the party to be held to such an agreement. Clearly, oral
agreements to devise property per se, violate the Statute of
Frauds and the California courts have so held.31 Oral agreements
of the type regulated by this subsection can arise in a variety of
circumstances. A common fact pattern concerns an oral agree-
ment to leave property in return for furnishing services for an in-
dividual's natural life.32 Since there is no time fixed for payment,
the contract falls within the purview of subsection 6 and must
meet its terms.33 Another frequent factual pattern involves an
oral agreement not to revoke a will, whether or not it be joint or
mutual,34 or to execute a will to accomplish a promised result.35
The merger of contracts and wills under subsection 6 is both in-
teresting and confusing. 36 A will, by definition, must be revokable
during the lifetime of the testator; therefore, the instrument theo-
retically is not a will if the testator cannot revoke it.37 The mere
30. Id.
31. See e.g., Rotea v. Izuel, 14 Cal. 2d 605, 612, 95 P.2d 927, 931 (1939); Murdock
v. Swanson, 85 Cal. App. 2d 380, 385-86, 193 P.2d 81, 83-84 (1948).
32. Manford v. Coats, 6 Cal. App. 2d 743, 745-46, 45 P.2d 395, 395-96 (1935).
33. Any fair and reasonable interpretation that indicates the contract cannot
possibly be performed within one year is unenforceable under the statute. Dough-
erty v. Rosenberg, 62 Cal. 32, 33 (1882); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624(6) (West 1973).
34. See note 2 supra.
35. Beard v. Melvin, 60 Cal. App. 2d 421, 423, 140 P.2d 720, 723 (1943) (an agree-
ment orally made wherein defendant would make provision in her will for plaintiff
because plaintifff refrained from presenting a claim in a prior estate proceeding).
36. A nuncupative will is a special statutory exception to the general require-
ment of a writing found in CAL. Crv. CODE § 1624(6). In contrast to the establish-
ment of the validity of an oral will contract through exceptions to the Statute of
Frauds (see notes 147-71 infra and accompanying text), a nuncupative will in Cali-
fornia is oral and is limited in amount to $1,000 of personal property. In addition,
the testator must be in expectation of immediate death from injury received the
same day, or in actual shipboard or field duty. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 54-55. See P.
CALLAHAN, How TO MAKE A WILL 41 (1975). The nuncupative will must be proved
by two witnesses who were present at the making thereof, one of whom was asked
by the testator, at the time, to witness the words of disposition. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 54. The oral will contracts discussed in this comment were substantially over the
$1,000 limit; involve both real and personal property and do not involve actual ser-
vicepersons or shipboard mates.
37. Revocation can be formally accomplished by an instrument executed with
the same formalities as a valid will or by burning, tearing, cancelling and other
clear methods of destruction. CAL PROB. CODE § 74. An implied revocation occurs
when wholly inconsistent provisions are found in a subsequent will. Id. § 72; It
execution of a will in California in accordance with an oral will
contract without express reference to that oral agreement has
been held to be insufficient to satisfy the writing requirement of
the Statute of Frauds as to the contract. 38
The will--contract dichotomy does not present a consistent
means of property transfer because the right to devise property
demands freedom of choice, including the power to revoke at any
time.3 9 However, where a particular will is bound by contract so
that the testator promises not to revoke a will or to make a will in
a certain manner, different competing interests come into play
and the courts will not hesitate to enforce a remedy for a
breach.40
A. Early Development of Oral Agreement Decisions
Since the first Statute of Frauds was drafted and enacted in En-
gland,4 1 the California judiciary drew heavily on English authority
in developing its approach. In Walpole v. Orford,4 2 the chancery
court was presented with a situation where two parties executed
mutual wills pursuant to an agreement; one party died, where-
upon the surviving party changed his disposition. Lord Chancel-
lor Loughborough recognized the right of parties to enter into
agreements to devise property mutually pursuant to the authority
of Dufour v. Pereira,43 a case written by Lord Camden twenty-
eight years earlier. Dufour held that an agreement to make mu-
tual wills was binding and that since the survivor enjoyed the
benefits of her husband's disposition she must dispose of her
property similarly."
Despite this earlier case, the court in Walpole found that even
though the parties meant to impose the agreement on each other,
there was no certainty that the parties wished it to amount to a
legal obligation. The court found lacking the requisites necessary
to enforce such agreement, namely: (1) certainty and definiteness
may be partially revoked for surviving spouses or issue of a subsequent marraige.
Id. §§ 70-71. See generally, Estate of Rolls, 193 Cal. 594, 226 P. 608 (1924).
38. Shive v. Barrow, 88 Cal. App. 2d 838, 848-49, 199 P.2d 693, 696 (1948) (party
agreed to advance various sums of money "as needed" for the improvement of re-
alty in consideration of receiving the property in fee upon the death of the life ten-
ants).
39. J. Brr1AIN, INHERITANCE AND THE INEQUALITY OF MATERIAL WEALTH 1-3
(1978); J. Ritchie, N. Alford, & R. Effland, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 2-4 (3d
ed. 1967).
40. M. BIGELOW, LAW OF WnS 110-12 (1898).
41. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
42. 30 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. 1797).
43. 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (Ch. 1769), cited in Walpole v. Orford, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076,
1083 (Ch. 1797).
44. Id.
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of terms, (2) equality and fairness, and (3) proof in a manner re-
quired by law.4 5 The English courts also touched on this issue in
three other English cases: Fortescue v. Hennah,46 Logan v.
Weinholt,47 and Goilmere v. Battison.4 In Fortescue, a father had
covenanted during his life to transfer his property to his eldest
daughter and her first husband. The court held that his attempt
to make a testamentary gift short of immediate absolute gifts dur-
ing his lifetime was illegal because it would "furnish perpetual
opportunity for subterfuge and scheme to defeat and disappoint
these covenants, which ought to be most honourably observed." 49
In Logan, the testator defied his own promise to provide a dispo-
sition of property in consideration for the intended marriage of
his niece, and the court specifically enforced the promise.50 The
Goilmere case contains an unclear opinion, but seems to decide
that in 1682, a person had a right to enter into an agreement while
living to dispose of property at death. In all of these cases, the
courts found it uncomfortable to ignore the strong moral inequity
in allowing persons to promise some act or omission during their
lifetime and to promptly reverse that contractual seal with wholly
contradictory testamentary dispositions.51 The strength of our
Anglo-Saxon legal heritage led California courts, and courts in
many other states, to draw heavily from the holdings of the Eng-
lish cases such as Walpole, Dufour, Fortescue, Logan, and
Goilmere.52
45. 30 Eng. Rep. at 1085. The court almost seemed to wax from one extreme to
another on the issue of whether or not the parties wished the agreement to be le-
gally binding. The court first stated, "I must say, they meant to impose on each
other a legal and binding obligation; that that was their intention, and they meant
to do so." 30 Eng. Rep. at 1084. Yet later in the opinion the court says, "Here it is
uncertain whether they meant it to amount to a legal obligation." Id. at 1085.
46. 34 Eng. Rep. 443 (Ch. 1812).
47. 5 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ch. 1833), appealed, 6 Eng. Rep. 1046 (1833).
48. 1 Vern. 48 (1682). This case was cited by Walpole and relied upon substan-
tially, 30 Eng. Rep. at 1081 (Ch. 1797). In addition, the court in Goilmere found that
the agreement, made by the wife for another party, was to be performed against
the husband despite the fact he was a devisee of the will. The case is almost in-
comprehensible as to its rule, but establishes the right of a person to enter into an
agreement while living to dispose of property at death.
49. 34 Eng. Rep. 443, 445 (Ch. 1812).
50. 5 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ch. 1833).
51. See note 48 supra.
52. See e.g., Brinton v. VanCott, 8 Utah 480, 483-85, 33 P. 218 (1893); Parsell v.
Stryker, 41 N.Y. 480, 483, 487 (1869); Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N.J. Eq. 332, 336-37
(1855); VanDyne v. Vreeland, 11 N.J. Eq. 370, 381 (1857); Faxton v. Faxton, 28 Mich.
159, 161 (1873). Counsel in Goilmere also argued these early cases vigorously in
B. Oral Will Contracts and the California Supreme Court
1. The court's first impressions, 1896-1934. In the early case of
Owens v. McNally,5 3 a case where the decedent had agreed to
leave his estate to a niece who came to care for him, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court defined the scope of the important right to en-
force an oral promise to leave property to another in reward for
particular services, provided there is a contract with the promises.
The common law on the subject, derived initially from England54
and through various eastern states, was adopted by the California
courts and prevailed for the next century. The Owens court ob-
served with curiosity the multitude of cases in other jurisdictions
and noted that nearly fifty years of judicial history in California
had not produced a single case on the subject; thus, the oral will
contract question was being "presented to this court for the first
time." 55 Nevertheless, the court had no trouble in following the
common law cases56 and stating its approval of the general rule
that an oral contract to make a will can be specifically enforced.57
The contract also withstood the defendant's claim that the agree-
ment lacked certainty and was harsh and oppressive.5 8
To express its intuition that something was amiss, however, the
court refused to enforce this oral agreement on public policy
grounds, because the deceased had married and his wife had en-
tered into the marriage contract ignorant of the oral will agree-
ment, and because the wife had an expectation of surviving the
spouse's right of intestate succession. The court further found
that they would not enforce the contract even if it had been in
writing.59
The Owens case predated the 1905 statutory amendment dis-
cussed earlier that ostensibly barred contracts from taking effect
after death because of the lack of a writing.6 0 If the existing oral
agreements predated the 1905 amendments, they did not fall
within the statute.61 However, later cases soon began to comment
their trail briefs. See e.g., Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37, 37-41 (1870); Kofka v.
Rusicky, 41 Neb. 328, 329, 59 N.W. 788 (1894).
53. 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 (1896).
54. The court cited with approval the cases of Dufour, Walpole, Fortescue, Lo-
gan, and Goilmere as supporting the general rule that a "man may make a valid
agreement binding himself to dispose of his property in a particular way by last
will and testament, and a court of equity will enforce such an agreement specifi-
cally." Id. at 448.
55. 113 Cal. at 448, 45 P. at 711.
56. Id. at 447-48, 45 P. at 711.
57. Id. at 450, 45 P. at 712.
58. Id. at 451-52, 45 P. at 712. See note 32 supra.
59. Id. at 453-54, 45 P. at 713.
60. See text accompanying notes 28-29, supra.
61. Wolfsen v. Smyer, 178 Cal. 775, 782, 175 P. 10, 12 (1918).
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on the recently amended statute in an effort to shed light on the
trend of opinion. In Rogers v. Schlotterback,62 decided some eight
years after Owens, the court noted the amendment but since the
statute was enacted after the date of the contract, the court re-
fused to apply it. It is probable that the persuasive force of the
legislature's declaration of policy was not sufficiently controlling
when compared to the clear and unequivocal rule of Owens. 63
Two years later in Monsen v. Monsen,64 the court finally ad-
dressed the 1905 amendment, recognizing the manifest danger of
fraud, injustice, and perjury in the enforcement of oral agree-
ments.65 However, even though the California courts were belat-
edly recognizing the rule mandated by the legislature, the pre-
1905 cases involving oral agreements had already laid to rest the
anxieties the courts had about oral will contracts that had
prompted the legislature to amend the Statute of Frauds to re-
quire a writing in such cases.
The pre-1905 solution was quite simple. The law did not require
a contract that takes effect after the death of a party to be in writ-
ing 6 6 so long as sufficient evidence was present to prove a defi-
nite, certain, clear, just, and equitable oral contract.67 In practice,
this probably required as stringent a test of evidence as that cur-
rently used by the California courts. According to Justice Sloss in
Monsen:
Beyond all this, the evidence relied on, even if it could be regarded as
tending to show [with] sufficient precision the making of any contract,
fails utterly to support the precise contract alleged and found .... The
only agreement alleged and found, and the one which the court under-
takes to enforce, is one to give the plaintiff a child's share of the es-
tate .... 68
Examination of this class of cases indicates that there were suffi-
cient safeguards to prevent most available kinds of fraud and dis-
honesty. The courts provided these safeguards: before an oral
will contract could be enforced, the court (1) would be more strict
in examining the nature and circumstances of such agreements,
62. 167 Cal. 35, 138 P. 728 (1914).
63. Id. at 45, 138 P. at 732-33. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
64. 174 Cal. 97, 162 P. 90 (1916).
65. Id. at 98, 162 P. 90.
66. See Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 35, 45, 138 P. 728 (1914); Baumann v.
Kusian, 164 Cal. 582, 586, 129 P. 986, 987 (1913); Bell v. Wyman, 147 Cal. 514, 515, 82
P. 39, 41 (1905); Estate of Healy, 137 Cal. 474, 478, 70 P. 455, 456 (1902); Russell v.
Agar, 121 Cal. 396, 398, 53 P. 926, 927 (1898).
67. Monsen v. Monsen, 174 Cal. 97, 98-99, 162 P. 90, 91 (1916).
68. 174 Cal. at 103-04, 162 P. at 92-93.
and (2) would require satisfactory evidence of the fairness and
justness of the transaction. 69
The first anomaly about the 1905 amendments to the Statute of
Frauds is not that post-1905 oral will contracts must be in writing,
but that so many numerous exceptions are applied to the statute
as to negate any beneficial effect.70 In addition, after 1905 a multi-
tude of cases demonstrated that this statutory requirement was
not effective. It can be argued, however, that pre-1905 decisions
employed exceedingly effective legal tests to scrutinize the facts
and evidence.7 ' Almost forty years later the California Supreme
Court issued an opinion that would influence nearly every subse-
quent decision to reach the courts of California in this area.
2. The shift in direction: Notten v. Mensing, 1935-1950. In Not-
ten v. Mensing,72 a childless couple made an oral agreement that
bound each of them to leave all their property to the other on the
condition that the survivor would leave it equally to the heirs of
both. Upon his death the husband left his property entirely to his
spouse as was spelled out in their agreement. The wife accepted
this disposition. Ten years later, however, in breach of the agree-
ment, she left all her property to her own chosen heirs. The will
only entitled the husband's relatives to insignificant amounts.7 3
The court initially found that there had been in existence mu-
tual and reciprocal wills that were practically identical, executed
on the same day, witnessed by the same person, and made with
the provisions for collateral heirs to have carbon-copy assets. The
court also noted, however, that wills, being ambulatory in nature,
may be revoked even if there was an agreement not to revoke. 74
In other words, the fact that the effect of the agreement was em-
bodied in mutual wills, but not the oral contract itself, did not
serve to make the arrangement irrevocable. The court found that
the 1921 oral agreements of the parties regarding their testamen-
tary dispositions fell squarely within the Statute of Frauds.75 The
69. Wolfsen v. Smyer, 178 Cal. 775, 783, 175 P. 10, 12 (1918).
70. See notes 139-64 infra and accompanying text.
71. Stewart v. Smith, 6 Cal. App. 152, 156, 91 P. 667, 670 (1907); Schaadt v. Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co., 2 Cal. App. 715, 717, 84 P. 249, 250 (1906); Guradianship of
Hayden, 1 Cal. App. 75, 77, 81 P. 668, 669-70 (1905). CAL. CrV. CODE § 1624 (West
1973) was not the only code section to require a writing. Section 1973 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure contained identical provisions, except that it also
provided that "[ e vidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing or secondary evidence of its contents." 1937 Cal. Stats. 694. The Law
Revision Commission in 1965 found section 1973 to be irrelevant.
72. 3 Cal. 2d 469, 45 P. 2d 198 (1935).
73. Id. at 471-72, 45 P.2d at 199-200.
74. Id. at 473, 45 P.2d at 200; see note 37 supra.
75. Id. at 473-74, 45 P.2d at 200.
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parties then addressed these issues.
The beneficiaries of the oral agreement staked their claim on
the doctrine of quasi-specific performance.7 6 This doctrine in ef-
fect circumvents the revocability of the wills dilemma. Under the
doctrine, where there is an agreement not to revoke, and the
agreement is fair and reasonable with consideration present, the
court will equitably enforce a quasi-specific performance of the
agreement. This is done by designating the parties who are to re-
ceive the estate as constructive trustees. The intended benefi-
ciaries under the revoked mutual wills are protected in
accordance with enforceable contractual terms.77
Initially the court noted that the remedy of quasi-specific per-
formance requires for its utilization an enforceable agreement.78
This led to recitation by the court of the usual general rules for
such an agreement to be enforceable; it must be evidenced by a
writing sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds;79 mere execution of a will is not sufficient part perform-
ance to take the agreement out of the statute;80 and mere execu-
tion of mutual wills where a surviving party obtains benefits
under the other's will, fails to constitute part performance suffi-
cient to take the agreement out of the statute.81 But notwith-
standing these clear rules, the court held that a court of equity
would hold that the defendant's were estopped from pleading
Statute of Frauds because of the constructive fraud worked on
the decedent by the survivor who makes a mutual oral will con-
tract with the decedent, takes the benefits of a will, and then re-
vokes the mutual oral agreement.82 The supreme court therefore
held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action and sent the
case back for trial.83
76. Id. at 473, 45 P.2d at 200. See generally 1 B. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALiFOR-
MA LAW, CONTRACTS § 254 (8th ed. 1973).
77. Wolf v. Donahue, 206 Cal. 213, 220, 273 P. 547, 550 (1921) (the court upheld
specific performance of a contract to make a disposition of property by will in ex-
change for the care and services to an ill man for the remainder of his life).
78. 3 Cal. 2d at 473, 45 P. 2d at 209.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 473-74, 45 P.2d at 200.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Ultimately, the plaintiffs failed to make a case on two grounds. First, they
failed to prove at trial the existence of even an oral agreement. Notten v. Mensing,
20 Cal. App. 2d 694, 697-98, 67 P. 734, 737-38 (1937). Second, even if an oral agree-
ment had existed, the court concluded that it could not be specifically enforced by
a court of equity because of inadequacy of consideration: the benefits received by
Courts attempting to solidify Notten varied over the next fifteen
years. 84 The results in cases factually similar to Notten would
hinge on other issues85 such as the statute of limitations, 86 res
judicata in the probate court,87 jurisdiction,88 or indefiniteness. 89
These issues tended to act as a screen to the real issue of con-
structive fraud, and they would frequently have to be countered
by a plaintiff who wished to receive his rights under an oral agree-
ment. The arguments by the plaintiffs would involve a presenta-
tion of the exceptions to the requirement of a writing.
3. Modern decisional law--a focus toward the contracting par-
ties, 1950-1980. Beginning in the 1950's, however, the California
Supreme Court described the Notten case as controlling in the
celebrated case of Monarco v. LoGreco,9 0 decided by Justice Tray-
nor. Notten stressed the change of position and reliance aspects
of the agreement. 91 In Monarco, the court lucidly set forth the
doctrine that "in reality it is not the representation that the con-
tract will be put in writing ... but the promise that a contract
will be performed that a party relies upon when he changes his
position because of it."92 The court then turned from what the
the decedent were about one thousandth of the amount the plaintiffs were trying
to obtain. Id. at 698, 67 P. at 738.
84. 3 Cal. 2d at 473. See Shive v. Barrow, 88 Cal. App. 2d 838, 848, 199 P.2d 693,
699 (1948); DeMattos v. McGovern, 25 Cal. App. 2d 429, 432, 77 P.2d 522, 523 (1938).
See generally: Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure
Bequests, Devises or Intestate Succession, 28 HARv. L REV. 237 (1951); Note, Con-
tracts: Oral Agreement to Leave Property By Will, 20 CALIF. L REV. 654 (1931);
Schnebly, Contracts to Make Testamentary Dispositions as Affected by the Statute
of Frauds, 24 MICH. L. REV. 749 (1926).
85. 3 Cal. 2d at 474. Baker v. Bouchard, 122 tal. App. 708, 710, 10 P.2d 468, 469
(1932); Forbes v. Los Angeles, 101 Cal. App. 781, 788-90, 282 P. 528, 531 (1929);
Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 85-87, 193 P. 84, 86-87 (1920).
86. Luckwicki v. Guerin, 57 Cal. 2d 127, 133-34, 367 P.2d 415, 419-20, 17 Cal. Rptr.
823, 827-28 (1961) (plaintiff was the daughter of decedent Guerin; the defendant
was Guerin's wife who brought an action against the executor of Guerin's estate to
establish a constructive trust upon one-half of the property in the estate based
upon an oral contract in which they agreed to make reciprocal wills).
87. Bennett v. Forrest, 24 Cal. 2d 485, 494, 150 P.2d 416, 420-21 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (plaintiff who was the sister of decedent, brought an action to es-
tablish a constructive trust on property to be distributed to a prior spouse who,
upon dissolution of marriage, had entered into a settlement agreement).
88. Alocco v. Fouche, 190 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250-52, 11 Cal. Rptr. 818, 823 (1961) (a
gift of real property from mother to daughter was obtained by daughter by undue
influence and in violation of a contract contained in a joint and mutual will).
89. Harris v. Larter, 36 Cal. App. 2d 586, 594, 97 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1940) (husband
promised to leave to his wife his interest in any property held jointly by them; the
wife could use the property as necessary, and upon her death, she was to devise it
equally between their respective relatives; the agreement was held too indefinite
and uncertain to be enforced specifically).
90. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 627, 220 P.2d 737, 741-42 (1950).
91. 3 Cal. 2d 469, 477, 45 P.2d 198, 202 (1935).
92. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 626, 220 P.2d 737, 741 (1950).
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person who promised to perform said and instead looked to who
had accepted the benefits of an oral contract and his subsequent
unjust enrichment.93
In Monarco, an oral proposal to a child was made by his parents
that if he stayed home and worked they would keep their prop-
erty and deed the majority of it to him. In performance of this
agreement he remained at home and gave up all other opportuni-
ties.94 In California, the court held that the purpose of estopping
the defendant from asserting a lack of writing is to prevent uncon-
scionable injury where one party has agreed to change position in
reliance on an agreement or where unjust enrichment would re-
sult.95 Justice Traynor then bemoaned the inadequacy of a legal
remedy in the facts presented,96 and also commented on the inap-
propriateness of the quasi-contractual remedy of reasonable value
of services performed to satisfy the surviving contracting party.9 7
The Monarco decision thus makes the need for deciding on the
proper cause of action of utmost importance 98 because a degree of
unjust enrichment clearly is to be found in every case. Further-
more, the existence of a Statute of Frauds that governs disposi-
tions to take effect at death seems to take on an ever decreasing
importance. While its protective purpose of preventing fraud and
abuse seems to be an obstacle of no immediate consequence, it
has been seriously dealt with in California in oral situations since
the 1920's.
II. FORMATION OF WILL CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA
Meeting the prerequisites for a valid oral agreement is of para-
mount importance to the enforceability of an oral will contract
and it is often underestimated. The courts have not completely
forgotten the lessons of an era when there was no Statute of
93. Id.
94. Id. at 622, 220 P.2d at 739.
95. Id. at 623-24, 220 P.2d at 739-40.
96. Id. at 626; 7 B. WrrKm, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 3 (8th ed.
1974).
97. 35 Cal. 2d at 626, 220 P.2d at 741. This, in essence, represented a slight
change from the Notten enunciation of the rule. In Notten, the court said that had
the contract been in writing then it might be susceptible to quasi-specific perform-
ance. 3 Cal. 2d at 473, 45 P.2d at 200. In Monarco the court did not cite Notten on
this proposition, nor did it mention the requirement of a writing as a valid distinc-
tion.
98. See notes 199-203 infra and accompanying text.
Frauds to prevent fraud and perjury. 99 Many states found an im-
petus in the dangers of freely enforcing oral contracts for the es-
tablishment of a writing requirement for contracts to make
testaments, 0 0 and also further protected against the threat of
fraud by requiring clear proof of oral contracts.
California first evidenced this concern in Rolls v. Allen.101 In
Rolls an equitable action was commenced for specific perform-
ance to enforce provisions of joint and mutual wills, which a
widow had ignored after inheriting the estate of her spouse. The
court found that the mutual wills were not executed pursuant to a
contract; therefore the widow had a right to distribute the prop-
erty left by her spouse without complying with the mutual wiU.1
02
The Rolls court developed a test requiring the parties attempting
to prove an agreement to do so with "indisputable" evidence. The
evidentiary tests for oral will contracts are the central stepping
stones to proving agreements that have been characterized as
"easy to fabricate and hard to disprove."' 03
A. Evidentiary Requirements in California
The plaintiff has the burden to prove any purported oral will
contract. 0 4 The relative weight to be accorded the testimony and
other circumstantial evidence is a matter of trial court determina-
tion.10 5 Since Rolls, the court has formulated the new test as
found in Notten v. Mensing.106 That court emphasized the neces-
sity of showing "clearly" a valid contract.107 Stated in more mod-
ern terms, California requires 'clear and convincing evidence' of
the oral contract.l0 8
99. See 1 PAGE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WnaS § 10.10 (1941).
100. See e.g., ALAsKA STAT., § 09.25.010(2) (1973); HAW. REV. STAT. § 656-1 (7)
(Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 59, § 9 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. Est., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAw § 13-2.1(2) (McKinney 1967); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN tit. 3,
§ 26.01(1) (Vernon 1968).
101. 204 Cal. 604, 269 P. 450 (1928).
102. Id., at 608-09, 269 P. at 452.
103. Hunter v. Allen, 174 Ore. 261, 147 P.2d 213 (1944), 1 PAGE, supra note 1,
§ 10.43 n.12.
104. Sparks v. Lauritzen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 269, 272, 56 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (1967)
(action to impose a constructive trust upon all of the assets of an estate; an oral
will agreement was made in return for a promise to make the decedent a member
of the family; the agreement was found lacking in consideration).
105. Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 587-88, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 616, 349 P.2d 289,
296 (1960) (case involved an enforceable oral agreement regarding the making of
mutual wills and the use and distribution of property upon the death of either the
survivor of the agreement breached after remarriage by leaving property in con-
travention to the agreement).
106. 3 Cal. 2d at 469, 45 P.2d 198 (1935) and text accompanying notes 72-83
supra.
107. Id. at 475, 45 P.2d at 201.
108. Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 749, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973)
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The recent case of Cameron v. Crocker Citizens National
Bank,109 illustrates the substantive impact of the burden of prov-
ing an agreement by clear and convincing evidence. Many de-
fendants assert that this burden is not capable of being met with
sufficient clarity and conviction to establish anything even re-
motely similar to a contract. In Cameron, a long courtship and
subsequent short marriage resulted in a divorce settlement agree-
ment limiting alimony payments to $1,000 per month for five
years. Plaintiff returned from Europe and lived in California until
her ex-husband's death, when she testified that her return to Cali-
fornia was prompted by Cameron's oral promise that he would
provide for her while alive and leave her a child's portion of his
Los Angeles property. His will was never found and plaintiff as-
serted her services entitled her to the promised share of dece-
dent's property.
The court found the strong showing of proof to be necessitated
by "the manifest danger of fraud, perjury and injustice that may
inhere in a recognition of the right to alter, by parol testimony,
the course of the disposition of the property of a decedent.""10
In Cameron, the deceased testator was told, "You know, Dad,
you should make provisions for Cozy, Ernie and Jean.""' The
court expressed its skepticism as to the probative value of this
conversation. The court dismissed as "far-fetched" the notion
that such a statement indicated that the testator had executed a
will to fulfill a contractual obligation, since the speaker was igno-
rant of the alleged oral agreement at the time the statement was
made and could not have been reminding her father of any legal
obligation."12 The court finally upheld the trial courts determina-
tion that plaintiff had failed by clear and convincing evidence to
prove the existence of an oral contract on the part of decedent to
provide for her by will. 3
(complaint by children of deceased parents to enforce an oral agreement and mu-
tually executed wills; the agreement was found enforceable because unjust enrich-
ment would result if the Statute of Frauds was applied); Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal.
2d 469, 477, 45 P.2d 198, 202 (1935).
109. 19 Cal. App. 3d 940, 97 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1971).
110. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 944, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 271, citing Monsen v. Monsen, 174
Cal. 97, 98, 162 P. 90 (1916).
111. Cameron v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 19 Cal. App. 3d 940, 945-97, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 269, 272-73 (1971).
112. Id. at 945, n.7, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 272, n.7.
113. In Cameron the plaintiff was apparently aware that the deceased had said
he would provide for her by will. Id. at 945-46, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
The reason for this higher standard, as opposed to a fair pre-
ponderence of the evidence, is probably the serious consequences
of finding an oral will agreement. Such an agreement may pre-
vent the modification of a person's estate plan to current circum-
stances, such as remarriage, lapse, or change in size of the estate.
A strict application of the evidentiary test has the effect of
preventing undue burden by inappropriate dispositions, to which
even the deceased spouse may have objected.14
In some cases, the line between a contract supported by clear
and convincing evidence and a bare promise, is relatively cer-
tain.115 If, however, the agreement is of sufficient substance to be
at least a collateral agreement,116 then a breach of contract still
occurs when a party who makes a disposition of property by will
later makes a different one from that agreed." 7 Other case law
points out, that the time of the breach is when the testator fails at
death to comply, as promisor, with his or her given promise to al-
locate in a certain manner."18 At the death of the party who has
breached, a cause of action for damages for quasi-specific per-
formance is clearly available," 9 and the court will find a legal ob-
114. Lamberg v. Callahan, 456 F.2d 1213, 1218 (1972) citing Rolls v. Allen, 204
Cal. 604, 269 P. 450 (1928).
115. See Fallon v. American Trust Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 381, 385, 1 Cal. Rptr. 386,
389 (1959). In Fallon, a well reasoned opinion of Justice Tobriner stated:
The policy of protection of an alleged obligor against parol claims, em-
bodied in the Statute of Frauds, becomes particularly pertinent in the at-
tempted enforcement of such a claim after the death of the alleged
promisor. Here, to escape the ban of the statute the decisions require
more than a bare promise; the easy concoction of a claimed oral agree-
ment offers too likely a method to obtain property in violation of the dece-
dent's intent.
176 Cal. App. 2d at 385, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 389.
116. Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 269 P. 450 (1928); Notten v. Mensing, 20 Cal.
App. 2d 694, 697 (1937).
117. Goldstein v. Hoffman, 213 Cal. App. 2d 803, 812, 29 Cal. Rptr. 334, 339-40
(1963) (breach of an agreement to make a disposition of property in a will; the
agreement was enforced through summary judgment for specific performance; the
court disposed of the property pursuant to the last will, but as modified by the
agreement; respondent used a constructive trust theory and thereby negated any
condition precedent; the constructive trust is required in order to present a claim
in probate for a money judgement). See also notes 198 infra and accompanying
text. See also Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P. 2d 878 (1949),
citing Osborn v. Hoyt, 181 Cal. 336, 184 P. 854 (1919) and Rogers v. Schlotterback,
167 Cal. 35, 48, 138 P. 728, 734 (1914) (intervivos conveyances can give an immediate
cause of action to the promise before the death of the promisor).
118. Luckwicki v. Guerin, 57 Cal. 2d 127, 133-34, 367 P.2d 415, 419-20, 17 Cal. Rptr.
823, 827-28 (1961); see note 86 supra for facts of the case, Brewer v. Simpson, 53
Cal. 2d 567, 593, 349 P.2d 289, 304; 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 624 (1960) see note 105 supra for
facts of the case.
119. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 563-64, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949)
(breach of written contract to make mutual wills wherein it was alleged by plain-
tiff that the survivor ignored the beneficiaries of the decedent by transferring as-
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ligation forbearing its revocation. 120 The courts find, absent an
express agreement not to revoke, that a promised testamentary
disposition necessarily includes an implied promise not to breach
the oral contract by revoking the will and failing to dispose as
agreed. The court implies this by superimposing an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing on both promisors and promis-
ees. Good faith can include an obligation on the survivor not to
make unreasonable use of the property subject to agreement dur-
ing his lifetime. 121
It should be once again emphasized that there must be a pre-
liminary finding of the agreement's existence by clear and con-
vincing evidence. One case of importance that illustrates this
sets to her new spouse without consideration and with intent to circumvent the
beneficiaries).
120. Thompson v. Boyd, 217 Cal. App. 2d 365, 380, 32 Cal. Rptr. 513, 518 (1963).
This case is an excellent example of the effects of a lack of such a contract.
Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 593, 349 P.2d 289, 304, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 624 (1960)
(lifetime obligation of beneficiary to maintain corpus through reasonable use).
See Stone, infra note 219, at 230-40. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 563-64,
212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
121. As stated in Beard v. Melvin, 60 Cal. App. 2d 421, 140 P.2d 720 (1943):
The question of when the statute of limitations begins to run in cases
where services have been rendered to a decedent under an oral contract
to compensate by will [citations omitted] has apparently been one caus-
ing considerable difference of opinion in the courts of this state. In most
of these cases the services were rendered up to the time of the death of
the promisor, and in such cases it has been held that the statute of limita-
tions did not begin to run until the termination of the services, or, as it
was sometimes stated, until the promise to compensate by will has failed
of fulfillment. When the death of the promisor and the termination of the
services coincided the effect was the same whichever was said to start the
running of the statute. But in Long v. Rumsey, supra, the last services
rendered by the plaintiff to decedent terminated some sixteen years
before the latter's death, wherefore it became necessary to decide
whether the termination of the services or the death of the decedent was
to be the starting point. In its first opinion in the case (77 P.2d 1064), the
Supreme Court adopted the opinion of the District Court of Appeal and
held that the date of the death of the promisor governed.
It is the settled law of this state that when continuous personal services
are performed under an express agreement for compensation upon termi-
nation thereof, which agreement is unenforceable because not in writing
[citation omitted], the reasonable value of the services may be recovered
and that the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the ter-
mination of the services, which, in such cases, is usually upon the death of
the promisor. [citations omitted]
We conclude from the foregoing that if, under the allegations of plain-
tiff's complaint herein, any cause of action on an implied or quasi contract
arose, the obligation of Alice Melvin, if any such resulted, commenced at
the time when her obligation came into being, if it ever did. ..
60 Cal. App. 2d at 428-29, 140 P.2d at 725.
point is Harris v. Larter,122 where the husband conveyed to his
wife his interest in the property held by them and she agreed to
"take a good living out of it," and then upon her death to divide it
in half between relatives of both spouses.123 The court of appeal
refused to grant specific performance after the wife did not com-
ply, holding that the agreement was too uncertain to support en-
forcement. There was nothing to show which member of the
respective families should share, nor what should be the exact
proprotionate share of each party. Simply stated, the contract
was not sufficiently complete or definite to clearly disclose such
an intention.124 As in Harris, many courts would likewise fail to
find any supportable evidence, unless the existence of a writing
embodying part or all of the agreement was found.
B. Collateral Writings Between Parties
In many cases, the party intent upon proving the existence of a
valid and enforceable contract will look toward some outside indi-
cation of the contract. Postal letters have found their way into
several cases and have been urged to be a sufficient writing to sat-
isfy the Statute of Frauds. Recently, however, such letters have
been found not to provide clear and convincing evidence of an
agreement. 2 5
In Berdan v. Berdan,12 6 there was a contract between plaintiff's
father and mother to leave property by will equally to their two
sons, and the contract was evidenced by a letter stating that the
father "has executed a will, leaving the property to [the wife]."127
The court pointed out that despite this writing nowhere had the
writer agreed to leave his property to his wife nor had he agreed
not to revoke the will made in her behalf.128 The hornbook rule
pronounced by the court stated that even where a letter states
that the writer had executed a will disposing of the property in a
certain way, it did not express any agreement to do so, and was
122. 36 Cal. App. 2d 587, 97 P.2d 1035 (1940).
123. Id. at 593, 97 P.2d at 1035.
124. Id. at 594, 97 P.2d at 1038. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3390(5) (West 1970): 'The
following obligations cannot be specifically enforced: . . .An agreement, the terms
of which are not sufficiently certain to make the precise act which is to be done
clearly ascertainable."
125. Bee v. Smith, 6 Cal. App. 3d 521, 86 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1970) (grandfather and
wife had made reciprocal mutual wills, except both provided that on the survivor's
death the grandfather's heirs would take; wife breached the oral agreement; how-
ever, the trial court found that a letter used to support the existence of a contract
was insufficient evidence).
126. 39 Cal. App. 2d 478, 104 P.2d 622 (1940).
127. Id. at 485, 103 P.2d at 627.
128. Id.
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insufficient as a contract.129 The court will look to see if any writ-
ten words are present to indicate reliance on a contract by the
complying party.130
In another important "letter" decision, Bee v. Smith,13' the
grandfather and the wife had made mutual wills, each leaving all
property to the other, and if the respective spouse did not survive,
to the grandfather's heirs. Subsequently the grandfather wrote a
letter to the wife referring to the agreement as of that time and
telling her not to change it. He wrote on the letter that the wife
had agreed but the court noted that neither her signature nor her
initials could be found on the letter. The wife had stated she
would abide by the agreement, but after the grandfather's death,
she breached the agreement by leaving all of her estate to her
brothers and sisters.132 Centering on the issue of whether a bind-
ing contract to make a will existed, the court flatly found none
since the facts necessary to uphold such an agreement could not
be readily located in the record of the trial court.1 33
In contrast to postal letters, collateral writings recently have
grown to include other written evidence signed by both husband
and wife. A court found the execution of a written transmutation
agreement, characterizing all the property as the community
129. Id. See 7 B. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 29 at 5254 (8th
ed. 1973). The Berdan case involved a letter stating the writer had executed a will
disposing of property in a certain way, without expressing any agreement to do so,
and therefore was insufficient to create a contract.
130. Id. This subject deals particularly with the Statute of Frauds; see notes
144 infra and accompanying text.
131. 6 Cal. App. 3d 521, 86 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1970).
132. Id. at 523-24, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17.
133. The court stated:
Absence a reference to such an agreement in either will plus the failure
of the 1948 letter to suggest any earlier agreement negate existence of the
essential agreement when their separate wills were executed. Thus the
provisions of the 1945 wills cannot be looked to for corroboration of the
claimed agreement of 1948.
We must look to the letter as evidence of that essential agreement. That
letter, as well as its statement that it was "OKd by Edna," admittedly is in
the handwriting of Ulysses, but is nowhere signed or initialed by Edna. It
is evidence of Ulysses' [sic] agreement, but can hardly be extended to
show that Edna joined in or consented to the asserted agreement. [cita-
tions omitted] The only competent evidence of oral joinder in the agree-
ment by Edna is the testimony of appellant as to a conversation following
Ulysses' [sic] death. The question of credibility of this testimony was
wholly for the trial court, and should not be determined by us. The trial
court found that no such agreement was joined by Edna, and thus appar-
ently determined appellant's testimony to be inaccurate in this respect.
Id. at 526, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
property of the spouses, to be a strong factor negating the exist-
ence of any joint or mutual will contract. The court's reasoning is
that execution of a community property agreement and its subse-
quent utilization is sufficient to negate an intention of the spouses
to enter into an agreement that would establish a mutuality of
testamentary purpose for the ultimate disposition of their prop-
erty after the death of both spouses. 34 All these collateral writ-
ings serve to either weaken or strengthen the existence of a
binding contract.
In summary, technicalities in the contractual requirements in
this area are legion. A revocation of a will is an innocent act ex-
cept when there has been some mutual promise and detrimental
reliance. From a very early date it was evident a person could
make a valid contract binding himself to dispose of property in a
certain manner by testament, and a court of equity could enforce
such an agreement.135 It became similarly evident that clear evi-
dence of the presence of a contract was necessary.136 Gradually,
the formation test became a game of factual hide and seek with
the court looking to such diverse factors as whether a will was
found, existence of relevant correspondence,137 circumstances
surrounding the making of the agreement, 38 and oral testimony
of a witness to circumstantial evidence denoting a contract. 139 In
a recent case the California Supreme Court went so far as to en-
force an oral will contract on the basis of testimony given by a do-
mestic employee who testified that she had witnessed the wills,
and heard the promisor speak of a contract to protect the chil-
dren140
California courts are quick to point to the number and fre-
quency of decisions involving oral will contracts, and catalogue
the sometimes sordid motives of the person creating the oral will
contract. For example, possible illicit business motives may play
a role in the decision, 141 as may the promisor's desire for personal
134. In Re Estate of Richardson, 11 Wash. App. 758, 525 P.2d 816, 818 (1974), peti-
tion for review denied in orders, 84 Wash. 2d 1013 (1974) (the question was
whether or not a 1970 or 1973 document should be admitted to probate as dece-
dent's last will; the appellate court held that the ambiguities on the face of the
1970 document, identified as a joint will, prohibited a clear decision on whether the
parties had entered into a contract as a matter of law.
135. Estate of Rolls, 193 Cal. 594, 599, 226 P. 608, 609-10 (1924).
136. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. Blanc v. Connor, 167 Cal. 719,
723, 141 P. 217-18 (1914).
137. See notes 126-35 supra and accompanying text.
138. See generally Bell v. Wyman, 147 Cal. 514, 515, 82 P. 39, 39 (1905).
139. Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 748-49, 505 P.2d 1027, 1033, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187,
190-91 (1973).
140. Id.
141. Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1971).
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or financial gain following the death of the other spouse.142 De-
spite the motive, many cases have not turned on the sufficiency of
the evidence of a contract, but rather on the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds, and more importantly the exceptions
thereto. 143 What was clear and convincing evidence of a Contract
to make a Will in 1935, may not have to be so clear and convincing
in 1980 given recent developments in the court supported by ex-
ceptions to the Statute of Frauds.
HI. EXCEPTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Since 1905, an agreement to devise or bequeath any property, or
to make any provision for any person by will, must be in writ-
ing.'44 The Statute of Frauds requires evidence more reliable
than parol testimony, and absent a writing or sufficient memoran-
dum the agreement will not be enforced.145 As discussed ear-
lier, 4 6 the Statute in California was enacted to prevent fraud and
was not intended to shield, protect or aid a party to commit fraud.
Classically, if a joint or mutual will is destroyed or revoked by a
party who has orally agreed not to do so, a cause of action for
quasi-specific performance of the oral agreement and for the im-
position of a constructive trust would be barred by the Statute of
Frauds. An oral agreement which does not comply with the Stat-
ute of Frauds is unenforceable. A party to such an agreement
may assert the Statute as an absolute defense to enforcement.
147
142. 8 Cal. 3d at 750, n.2, 505 P.2d at 1030 n.2, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 191 n.2. See also 1
B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 254 (Supp. 1979).
143. Id.
144. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1624 (6)
(West 1973). Bonnear v. Bank of America, 84 Cal. App. 2d 107, 109, 190 P.2d 307, 309
(1948); Murdock v. Swanson, 85 Cal. App. 2d 380, 383, 193 P.2d 81, 83 (1948); Note,
Separation Agreements to Make Mutual Wills for the Benefit of Third Parties 18
HASTINGS L.J. 423, 427 (1967). Cf. CAL. COM. CODE § 2201 (West 1973) (similar pro-
vision for the sale of goods).
145. Riley v. Bear Creak Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 509, 551 P.2d 1213, 1220,
131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 387-88 (1976).
146. See text accompanying notes 12-22 supra.
147. 1 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 199 (8th ed. 1973).
See B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WnIS at 40 (1956):
At an early date it was decided that a contract not to be performed
within a year was within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds since it was
possible that it might be performed within that time. Although there has
been an occasional dissent from this position it is the almost universal
opinion and it is in accord with the construction placed upon that provi-
sion of the Statute in other types of contracts.
Id. (Footnotes omitted.)
Plaintiffs, however, may turn toward several important tools to
negate the statute's effectiveness.
A. Equitable Estoppel in the Oral Will Contract Setting
The word "estoppel" means simply that someone is prevented
from making a claim or assertion. For example, estoppel might
arise if Y makes a statement or performs an act, and the act or
statement was intended to induce and did induce X to change po-
sition. 148 This doctrine has been codified in California as Evi-
dence Code Section 623.149
Estoppel operates by depriving the party against whom it is in-
148. The basis of estoppel was founded in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1932):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Section 90 did not mention the Statute of Frauds directly in its text, but in the RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 178, comment f. (1932), it specifically does so as fol-
lows:
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel may
preclude objection on that ground in the same way that objection to the
non-existence of other facts essential for the establishment of a right or
defense may be precluded. A misrepresentation that there has been such
satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance on the reperesenta-
tion precludes proof by the party who made the representation that it was
false; and a promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied upon, may
give rise to an effective promissory estoppel, if the statute would other-
wise operate to defraud.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 217A (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7'1973). 217A spe-
cifically codified situations in which reliance on oral contracts was involved:
(1) A promise which the promisor reasonably expects to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Stat-
ute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only be enforce-
ment of the promise, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) The availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly can-
cellation and restitution.
(b) The definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance
in relation to the remedy sought.
(c) The extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evi-
dence of the making and terms are otherwise established by clear and
convincing evidence.
(d) The reasonableness of the action or forbearance.
(e) The extent to which the action or forbearance was forseeable by
the promisor.
Applying this to the California position on oral will contracts it becomes clearly
evident that the courts have emphasized, without reference, some portions of
§ 217A, particularly § 217 2(b) and 2(e). See e.g., Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 749,
505 P.2d 1027, 1031, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (1973); Stahmer v. Schley, 96 Cal. App. 3d
200, 202, 157 Cal. Rptr. 756, 757 (1979).
149. CAL. EVID. CODE § 623 (West 1966) provides:
"Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act
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voked of opportunity to prove the truth of a fact or to assert a sub-
stantial right.150 Since this operates contrary to the fact-finding
functions of a court of law, the use of estoppel in law is disfa-
vored.151 The legal estoppel doctrine is founded upon a judicial
policy of encouraging finality and conclusiveness in recorded
transactions.152 Most estoppel defenses, therefore, arise in equity,
rather than in law.153 In an equitable sense, the doctrine is not
directly limited to a specific factual situation, nor is it structured
by exceptions, rules and regulations, rather it is founded upon a
balancing process.
An illustration of estoppel in the oral will contract context can
be quickly posed for review. X and Y, who are husband and wife,
enter into an oral agreement that each will execute a reciprocal
will that leaves all property to B. The wills in question refer to an
oral agreement between X and Y concerning the above disposi-
tions of their property. X dies first and her will is probated. The
relationship between X and B deteriorates after the death of X.
Y then marries Z and subsequently changes his will leaving all of
the property to his selected beneficiaries, P, Q, and S. Y then
dies and his will is probated. B files an action requesting that the
court determine that B is the beneficiary under Y's will, asserting
that an oral agreement to make joint wills with himself as benefi-
ciary should be controlling. B is asking the court to impose a con-
upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement
or conduct, permitted to contradict it."
150. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 41-42 (1973).
151. S. FORD, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 34-35 (1974). This is a balancing ap-
proach that does not lend itself well to the law court. The principle that a wrong-
doer should not be able to take refuge behind the shield of his own wrong is a
truism. The United States Supreme Court has espoused the doctrine in these
terms: "To decide the case we need look no further than the maxim that no man
may take advantage of his own wrong. Deeply rooted in our jurisprudence this
principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by both law and eq-
uity courts .. " Glus v. Brooklyn Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959).
The promise by the obligor to leave property in a certain manner upon his death
is a binding promise upon consideration being rendered, being supported by the
co-extensive legal performance or forbearance by the obligee. If the contract is
oral, this consideration rendered in reliance on the promise constitutes a primary
reason for enforcement. The fact that obligor is said to be estopped to plead the
Statute of Frauds is a more formal way of saying that the promise will now be en-
forced, even though it may not have been enforceable when made.
152. D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 42 (1973).
153. Moss v. Bluemm, 229 Cal. App. 2d 70, 72-73, 40 Cal. Rptr. 50, 52 (1964). See
also, e.g., City of Culver City v. State Board of Equalization, 29 Cal. App. 3d 404,
411, 105 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606 (the defense of estoppel is applicable against govern-
mental entities in California.)
structive trust on P, Q, and S, with himself as the beneficiary. A
constructive trust may be judicially imposed if a court determines
that a person will be unjustly enriched if he or she receives cer-
tain property. To remedy this unjust enrichment, the court will
say, in effect, that the unjustly enriched person does not really
have full ownership of the property but is really holding it in trust
for the true owner and must give it to the true owner.
154
By bringing the action in equity, B has circumvented a defense
of P, Q, and S that B did not make a claim in the administration
of the estate of Y.155 However, assuming that this action is one to
impose a constructive trust, there is possibly a requirement that a
claim must be filed in the administrative proceeding.
156
P, Q, and S would argue that the agreement is invalid because
it falls under the Statute of Frauds and, as such, must be in writ-
ing and signed by the party to be charged. 157 Since the oral agree-
ment not to change the reciprocal wills was not evidenced by a
writing,158 a cause of action for quasi-specific performance of the
alleged oral agreement and to impose a constructive trust should
be barred by the Statute of Frauds. 59
B would argue that the Statute of Frauds was enacted to pre-
vent fraud and not to shield Y. The estoppel argument would be
asserted by B to counter P, Q and S's Statute of Frauds defense.
A survey of the California cases shows the burden would be
154. The constructive trust may be characterized as a passive trust in that the
only duty is to convey the property. In California, constructive trusts are covered
by two general code sections. CAL. CiV. CODE § 2224 (West 1954) states: "One who
gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust,
or other wrongful act, is unless he or she has some other and better right thereto,
an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would
otherwise have had it." See also CAL. Crv. CODE § 2223 (West 1954).
155. Alderson v. Houston, 154 Cal. 1, 96 P. 88 (1908); McManis v. Bendlage, 82
Cal. App. 2d 916, 187 P.2d 854 (2nd Dis. 1947); CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 430.10-432
(West Supp. 1980).
156. Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 147 P. 259 (1915). See CAL PROB. CODE
§ 707 (West Supp. 1979), discussing the requirement to bring a legal claim in the
Probate court. The claims must be filed within four months after the first publica-
tion of the notice. CAL. PROB. CODE § 700-19 (West Supp. 1979). See Palmer v.
Phillips, 123 Cal. App. 2d 291, 299, 266 P.2d 850, 853 (1954) (complaint insufficient to
state a cause of action for quantum meruit since no claim fied). It is interesting
to speculate whether B acquires his cause of action at the death of X, or whether
the filing of a complaint would be premature during the life of Y, see notes 208-210,
212 infra and accompanying text.
157. P, Q, and S would further argue that the wills themselves are not sufficient
writing to make such an agreement enforceable unless it specifically refers to the
agreement in its contents. Zellner v. Wasserman, 184 Cal. 80, 85-86, 193 P. 84, 86-87
(1920).
158. Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17 Cal. 3d 500, 509, 551 P.2d 1213, 1220,
131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 387-88 (1976).
159. Estate of Crawford, 69 Cal. App. 2d 607, 608, 160 P.2d 64, 65 (1945) (oral
agreement held unenforceable because it was not in writing).
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placed on B to prove the estoppel.160 California courts applying
the estoppel doctrine would find estoppel against Y where X had
died having relied to her detriment on Y's promise to make a re-
ciprocal will leaving all property to B.161
A recent example is the case of Redke v. Silvertrust.162 In
Redke, X predeceased Y. In reliance upon Y's oral promise to
provide for X's child, X refrained from changing her will. The
court stated that "X changed her position by maintaining the sta-
tus quo despite her concern over her daughter's welfare"'163 and
held, in accordance with prior case law,164 that Y was estopped
from asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. 65
B. Part Performance in Oral Will Contract Situations
Another equally important exception to the assertion of the
Statute of Frauds is the doctrine of part performance.166 An oral
agreement that is otherwise unenforceable may become binding
when there has been part performance. There are several re-
160. Id.
161. Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal. 2d 469, 473-74, 45 P.2d 198, 200 (1935).
162. 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1041
(1972).
163. 6 Cal. 3d at 101, 490 P.2d at 809, 98 Cal. Rptr. 297.
164. Day v. Greene, 59 Cal. 2d 404, 409, 380 P.2d 385, 388, 29 Cal. Rptr.785, 788-89
(1963); Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 588, 349 P.2d 289, 302, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 616
(1960); Monarco v. LoGreco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 674, 110 P.2d 737, 739-40 (1950). In Day
the husband intentionally changed his position by abstaining from making a testa-
mentary gift to his daughter and instead left his entire estate to a second wife in
reliance on the wife's oral promise to care for his daughter in the wife's own will.
Day held that the enforcement of the oral promise was not barred by the Statute
of Frauds, the court stating*
We are of the view that the trial court correctly determined that the
statute of frauds did not render the agreement unenforceable. Although
the statute requires that an agreement to make a provision by will be in
writing (Civ. Code Sec. 1624, subd. 6; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1973, subd. 6), a
party will be estopped from relying on the statute where fraud would re-
sult from refusal to enforce an oral contract .... The doctrine of estoppel
has been applied where an unconscionable injury would result from deny-
ing enforcement after one party has been induced to make a serious
change of position in reliance on the contract or where unjust enrichment
would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other's per-
formance were allowed to invoke the statute .... As we have seen, both
these grounds of estoppel were found to be present here.
59 Cal. 2d at 409, 380 P.2d at 388-89, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 788-89.
165. 6 Cal. 3d at 101.
166. See note 12 supra. For an excellent historical treatment of the part per-
formance doctrine see Kepner, Part Performance in Relation to Parol Lands, 35
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1950).
quirements for the use of part performance. 67 The performance
must flow from the party seeking to enforce the agreement. Usu-
ally an act will not be considered as part performance unless to
refuse relief against the party breaching the contract would work
a fraud upon the promisee.168 For example, the mere making of a
will by a promisor under an oral agreement is not part perform-
ance of that agreement sufficient to invoke the part performance
doctrine.16 9 On the other hand, the rendition of services by a
promisee pursuant to an oral agreement may be sufficient part
performance to remove the agreement from the Statute of Frauds
when the pecuniary value of the services is hard to evaluate. 70
C. Written Memorandum of Agreement
The third major exception to the Statute of Frauds is the exist-
ence of written memoranda that brings the oral agreement out of
the purview of the statute. This has been previously discussed
with respect to the adequacy of collateral writings such as letters
167. See generally Moreland, Statute of Frauds and Part Performance, 178 U.
PA. L. REV. 51 (1929).
168. 35 CAL. JUR. 3d Statute of Frauds § 92, at 121-22 (1977). The Section on part
performance states:
Oral agreements were originally unenforceable as a result of part per-
formance. The doctrine of part performance is based entirely on equitable
considerations, and hence there is no right to a jury trial. The primary
ground is that it would be a virtual fraud for the defendant, after permit-
ting part performance, to interpose the statute of frauds as a bar to the
plaintiff's remedy. Therefore, courts of equity in specifically enforcing
agreements where there has been part performance do not dispense with
the statute, but act within its true spirit and policy. However, part per-
formance, to take an oral agreement out of the statute of frauds, must be
performance by the party seeking to enforce the agreement, performance
by the other party not having any such effect. And nothing will be consid-
ered a part performance that does not put the purchaser or donee in a sit-
uation where to refuse relief would operate as a fraud on him. Moreover,
the facts in such cases must be so clear that there can be little or no ques-
tion of their effect or that they plainly and clearly call for the favorable
interposition of equity. However, if the trial court determines that specific
performance is allowable, an appellate court should not interfere unless it
clearly appears that the decision is inequitable and unjust.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
169. Shive v. Barrow, 88 Cal. App. 2d 838, 848, 199 P.2d 693, 699-700 (1948) (party
agreed to advance various sums of money "as needed" for the improvement of re-
alty in consideration of receiving the property in fee upon the death of the life ten-
ants); DeMattos v. McGovern, 25 Cal. App. 2d 429, 432, 77 P.2d 522, 523 (1938)
(complaint in specific performance of oral agreement wherein deceased promised
to bequeath property to plaintiff by will in compensation for services rendered in
an employer-employee relationship held unenforceable as within the statute of
frauds).
170. Walker v. Calloway, 99 Cal. App. 2d 675, 678-80, 222 P.2d 455, 457-58 (1950)
(husband who had terminal cancer contacted his divorced wife and offered and
agreed that if plaintiff would leave her home and come to Los Angeles he would
leave his entire estate to her by will enforceable through the doctrines of fraudu-
lent inducement and justifiable reliance).
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and separate related agreements, 171 and is aptly illustrated by de-
cisions such as Fallon v. American Trust Company,172 Berdan v.
Berdan,l7 3 and Bee v. Smith.174 The underlying rationale in these
cases is that a note or memorandum will satisfy the Statute of
Frauds where there is no serious probability of perpetrating a
fraud, even where the note or memorandum is informal or does
not contain all the terms to the agreement. Courts routinely find
that an adequate memorandum does exist, if there is sufficient
clarity of the essential terms of the agreement. 75
D. Decisional Expansion of Exceptions to the Statute
The original policy that allowed the enforcement of oral will
contracts was abrogated specifically by the legislature in 1905.176
In spite of this, the validity of oral will contracts has been upheld
by the courts because of the judicially created exceptions of part
performance, written memorandum, or estoppel177 have been in-
voked, effectively preventing the application of the Statute of
Frauds. On occasion the courts have found an agreement too in-
definite to enforce; 78 but more frequently courts have treated the
oral agreement as a valid and enforceable contract. 79
In the last eighty years the decisions determining the enforce-
ability of oral will contracts have tended to expand the exceptions
to the Statute of Frauds drastically narrowing the number of oral
will contracts that come within the statute, and in some cases,
opening the door to the types of inequities the Statute of Frauds
was enacted to prevent. In short, the exceptions may have swal-
171. See text accompanying notes 126-135 supra.
172. Fallon v. American Trust Company, 176 Cal. App. 2d 381, 385, 1 Cal. Rptr.
386, 389 (1959).
173. Berdan v. Berdan, 39 Cal. App. 2d 478, 103, P.2d 622 (1940).
174. Bee v. Smith, 6 Cal. App. 3d 521, 86 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1970). See notes 115, 117,
125-27 supra and accompanying text.
175. See generally 2 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS, Statute Of Frauds § 275 at 470-83,
498-506 (1950). If there is no writing, courts appear to require a stronger showing
of certainty. See text accompanying notes 105-16 supra.
176. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 12-13, 84, 167 supra and 183-84 iifra and accompanying text.
178. See supra section II, Formation of Will Contracts In California.
179. See note 183 infra and accompanying text. But see Kessler v. Lauretz, 39
Cal. App. 3d 441, 114 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1974) (alleged oral promise to bequeath not en-
forceable since the underlying right to reliance was not present and the alleged
agreement was in contradiction to plaintiffs approval of a marital property settle-
ment agreement).
lowed the rule.180 Admittedly, the statute permits persons who
have made an oral will contract to breach their promise, thereby
working a potentially grave inequity upon the intended benefi-
ciaries of the will. But the legislature has determined that this
type of inequity is either less distasteful or more easily avoided
than the injustice that occurs when the intended beneficiaries of
an estate are deprived of their inheritance by false claims of an
oral agreement. 181
The courts seem to regard the Statute of Frauds as a mere tech-
nical requirement rather than a measure that reflects the legisla-
ture's view of the substantive merits of the controversy,182 and
have given in to the temptation to expand the statute's exceptions
in oral will contract cases, to the point of total emersion. 83
Clearly such expansion may have caused widespread uncertainy;
and considering the specificity of the statute, 84 it is curious that
the courts were permitted to rely on such exceptions, particularly
when such exceptions had the effect of making social policy that
180. An increasing number of cases have demonstrated a judicial propensity to
invoke the doctrines of part performance, fraud, equitable estoppel, detrimental
reliance, constructive trust or quasi-contracts to defeat the operation of the Stat-
ute of Frauds. These areas tend to overlap and facts that will assist in one doc-
trine frequently do so for another. The trend recently has grown with the
codification of yet another exception to the statute into the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS, § 217A (Tent. Drafts No. 1-7, 1973). See Steinberg, Promissory
Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds, 44 FORDRA.M L REV. 114, n.
53 (1975).
181. See text accompanying notes 28-40 supra.
Reports of legislative hearings on this amendment are not available, but it is im-
portant to say that originally problems with the jury system, a lack of consistent
and unified rules of evidence, i.e. the disqualification of plaintiff's testimony under
the Dead Man's Statute, all served to prompt enactment of the subsection that is
discussed in this article. Cf. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the
Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 441 (1931); The writing requirement in
California probably impresses upon the parties the importance of the act they are
about to enter into with each other. It also makes the court emphasize a danger of
perjury concerning such contracts. Cf. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLum.
L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941).
182. 2 A. CoRBn, CONTRACTS, Statute of Frauds, § 275.
183. Comment, Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 26 KAN. L REV. 327, 334
(1978). See e.g., Crail v. Blakely, 8 Cal. 3d 744, 505 P.2d 1027, 106 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1973) (estoppel-party committed suicide in reliance on the oral agreement); Pot-
ter v. Bland, 136 Cal. App. 2d 125, 129-30, 288 P.2d 569, 572 (1955) (written memoran-
dum); Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 101, 490 P.2d 805, 808-09, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293,
296-97 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1041 (1972) (estoppel). See note 181 supra.
184. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1624(6) (West 1973). See also Perillo, The Statute of
Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FoRDHAm L.
REV. 39, 42-43, n.29 (1974); Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronsim, 3
IND. L. J. 427 (1928); Note, Exception is the Rule, 37 MOD. L REV. 695 (1974) (in
English cases a memorandum is sufficient to constitute a valid contract); Com-
ment, Operation of the Doctrine of Part Performance in Particular to Actions for
Damages, 8 U. QUEEN L REV. 79 (1973); Comment, Doctrine of Estoppel Gains a
Foothold Against the Statute of Frauds, 1 CAP. L. REV. 205 (1972).
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determined the distribution of substantial wealth.185
Oral will contracts have been held enforceable in the face of the
Statute of Frauds in the area of pre-trial procedural appeals. One
example is the 1979 case of Stahmer v. Schley.186 In that decision,
a wife died subsequent to entering an oral agreement with her
husband to make a joint will disposing of their respective estates.
Under the joint will, the property of the predeceased spouse
would go to the survivor. Upon the survivor's death all of the es-
tate would then go to named beneficiaries. Instead of probating
the joint will, the husband kept his wife's property, and then exe-
cuted a new will.187
On the husband's death, the new will was offered for probate.
The beneficiaries under the joint will brought a complaint for
quasi-specific performance of the agreement to leave property by
will and for a constructive trust. Defendant's demurrer was sus-
tained on the grounds that there was no written agreement not to
revoke the joint will by the survivor. The appellate court reversed
the trial court judgment and found the factual allegations of the
complaint to state a cause of action for quasi-specific performance
and constructive trust under a derivative fraud theory. The court
stated that "[c]oncededly, the legal structure of quasi-specific
performance based on derivative estoppel to prevent unjust en-
richment is a somewhat rickety bridge with which to span the
Statute of Frauds .. "188
The derivative fraud theory is based upon the actual, construc-
tive, implied or extrinsic fraud inherent when one party relies on
a promise to his or her deteriment, only to have the promisor
breach the agreement.I8 9 Upon proof of a transfer or will made in
reliance upon an oral agreement to hold in trust and upon proof
of the subsequent repudiation of the agreement, it can success-
185. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (on the dan-
ger of the courts legislature becoming a super legislative group that overrules the
decisions of the democratically elected branches).
186. 96 Cal. App. 3d 200, 202, 157 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1979).
187. Id. at 203, 96 Cal. Rptr at 757-58.
188. Id. at 204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
189. The doctrine is entwined along with theories of constructive trust within
the meaning of Civil Code Section 2224 enacted in 1872:
One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the
violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other and
better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the
benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2224 (West 1954).
fully be inferred that the maker of the promise had an intention
not to perform at the time the original promise was made, which
can be argued to the trier of fact in the form of actual fraud.190
Fraud has already been used in oral will contract cases.191
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF A PROTECTABLE INTEREST
The vagueness and lack of legislative guidelines surrounding
cases involving oral will contracts serves to further complicate the
present position of the law. Many gray spots surround this area.
If mutual wills are present, can promisors violate an oral agree-
ment while they are both living? Is there adequate consideration
to enforce an oral will contract before the death of one of the par-
ties? If so, what remedies would be available?
A promisor may breach an alleged oral will contract by an in-
tervivos transfer of property after the death of the other party,
but before his own death. In California these gifts are character-
ized as testamentary. "[I]n order to protect the agreement or ob-
ligation, . . . courts of equity will treat this gift in the same
manner as if it were purely testamentary, and were included in
the will .... "192 Exactly where the line is to be drawn is unclear.
A. Judicial Remedies After Breach of an Oral Will Contract
In Estate of Cooper,193 M and B each signed joint wills and gave
"to the survivor [of M and B] all and any real and personal prop-
erty [each] owned ... for his or her own use and benefit for-
ever."194 The survivor was to leave the property to designated
nephews, and a clause in the will was provided naming these ben-
eficiaries who would then take on the death of the spouse surviv-
ing.' 9 5 There was no breach of contract in the case, but there
were substantial inheritance tax issues presented. After both
spouses died and inheritance tax reports were filed; a probate
hearing was held and the survivor was found to have a life inter-
est in the assets of the estate subject to a reasonable use by her.
The controller determined the tax on the estate of M by taxing a
life interest of B, and the remainder to the named devisees. The
190. Jarkieh v. Badagiacco, 75 Cal. App. 2d 505, 170 P.2d 994 (1946).
191. See e.g., Kessler v. Lauretz, 39 Cal. App. 3d 441, 446, 114 Cal. Rptr. 42, 44
(1974); (the court sometimes will imply the perpetration of a "constructive" fraud
under the facts of the case). See e.g., Stahmen v. Schley, 96 Cal. App. 3d 200, 203-
04, 157 Cal. Rptr. 756, 758 (1979).
192. Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 35, 49, 138 P. 728, 734 (1914), citing John-
son v. Hubbell, 10 N.J. Eq. 332, 66 Am. Dec. 773 (1885).
193. 274 Cal. App. 2d 70, 78 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1969).
194. Id. at 78, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
195. Id. at 79, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
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court characterized the interest as a power of use and consump-
tion. The Cooper court felt perfectly content with its holding
since the instrument provided a limitation over to a third party;
the life estate was created in the devisee wife, even though it was
not expressly declared as such.196
In Cooper, the court discussed the several remedies available to
the ultimate beneficiaries. If the spouse had attempted during
her life either to transfer the property or to execute a new will,
she would have been in violation of the provisions of the agree-
ment. Assuming a joint or mutual will is executed during the
lives of the couple, the original contract rights vest on the mutual
promise of the contracting parties, carried forth by the execution
of a mutual will, and the vested contract rights apparently are
protected against revocation, except by mutual consent. 9 7 This is
inconsistent with the rule of law that allows the free revocation of
a will before death,198 recognizing no vested rights in the benefi-
ciaries until death.199 The Cooper case shows the possibility that
an agreement between two parties relating to their mutual dispos-
itive scheme might establish enforceable rights at the moment of
execution.200
This analysis is equally compelling in the event of execution of
a new will. In practice, the presence of the new will can usually
be kept secret until its admission into probate 201 because while
the party is still living such information is confidential and cannot
be disclosed by the party's attorney to any person without con-
sent.202 Regardless, the oral will agreement is violated when the
original will is revoked by an inconsistent subsequent will.203 Ar-
guably a party or beneficiary need not wait until the death of both
196. Id.
197. 274 Cal. App. 2d at 79, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
198. CA.L PROB. CODE §§ 70-75, B. WrrxiN, SuMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAws, Wills
and Probate § 150, at 5666 (8th. ed. 1974).
199. Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, 644, Ill P.2d 322, 326 (1941) (controversy con-
cerning the proceeds of life insurance and its apparent distribution under a will
previously written).
200. Estate of Cooper, 274 Cal. App. 2d 70, 79, 78 Cal. Rptr. 740, 743-46 (1969);
Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 35, 53 (1914).
201. CAL. PROB. CODE § 27 (West Supp. 1980) states in relevant part: "A testa-
mentary disposition may be made... to natural persons capable by law of taking
property...."
202. I, CALORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BA, CALIFORNIA DECEDENT
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION § 1.19 at 17 (Victor C. Chuan & Irving Slater ed. 1971).
203. In Cooper the court stated, "[I] t has also been recognized that the promis-
ees of such a contract need not wait until the death of the promisor but may seek
parties to bring an action to enforce an agreement not to revoke a
will. 204
B. The Prerequisites of Probate Procedure
Upon the initiation of probate, an oral promisee may be barred
from asserting legal claims if he or she does not file a copy of the
supporting contract, or supply affidavits supporting the oral prom-
ise that was relied upon as a "claim" for a liability under Probate
Code Section 707.205 A claimant who does not fie a claim against
the estate in a timely fashion may be barred from proceeding
against the estate, assuming proper notice was received.206
This bar arises most often in cases where services of a personal
nature are promised in exchange for a promise to be provided for
by will. Holders of such a claim cannot file an action, unless a
claim is first presented to an executor or administrator. 207 After
rejection, or if no rejection within 10 days of service or filing,208 a
complaint can be brought outside of probate.209 If services have
been rendered, the cause of action has been held to not involve
enforcement of an oral contract, rather the plaintiff would be
seeking to recover under quantum meruit for the value of the
equitable relief against inter vivos conveyances made by him in fraud of their
rights. . . ." 274 Cal. App. 2d at 79.
204. See note, Mutual Wills: Undue Influence, Revocability, and Rights of Third
Party Beneficiaries, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 858, 861 (1960).
205. CAL. PROB. CODE § 700 (West Supp. 1980) governs the time to file a claim
based on a contract: (a) [A]ll claims arising upon contract, whether they are due,
not due, or contingent, and all claims for funeral expenses and all claims... must
be filed or presented within the time limited in the notice or as extended by the
provisions of section .. . 709 of this Code. CAL. PROB. CODE § 707 (West Supp.
1980).
206. In re Estate of Cross, 51 Cal. App. 3d 80, 88, 123 Cal. Rptr. 825, 830 (1975);
Estate of Hincheon, 159 Cal. 755, 759-60, 116 P. 47, 49 (1911).
207. CAL. PROB. CODE § 716 (West 1956) states in pertinent part: "No holder of a
claim against an estate shall maintain an action thereon, unless the claim is first
filed with the clerk or presented to the executor or administrator .. "
208. CAL. PROB. CODE § 712 (West 1956) states as follows in pertinent part:
If, when a claim has been filed without presentation, the executor or ad-
ministrator refuses or neglects to fie his allowance or rejection for ten
days after the claim has been fied, or if, when a claim has been presented
before filing, the executor or administrator refuses or neglects to indorse
such allowance or rejection for ten days after the claim has been
presented to him, or if the judge refuses or neglects to indorse such ap-
proval or rejection for ten days after the claim has been presented to him,
such refusal or neglect may, at the option of the claimant, be deemed
equivalent to a rejection on the tenth day.
209. The Statute of Limitation is three months after rejection of a claim if the
debt is then due, or two months after it becomes due. CAI. PROB. CODE § 714
(West 1956); See also Drvol v. Bant, 183 Cal. App. 2d 351, 355-57, 7 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-6
(1960) (3 month statute).
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services performed.210 A more important case in California is
where the oral contract to devise is not entered into in exchange
for the rendering of personal services, but for some other reason
such as family ties, estate planning, dissolution judgments, or
some moral obligation. In these cases the property expected to be
received may be much more than if only personal services were
rendered.
C. The Cause of Action and its Impact
To prevent distribution of assets to the devisees of the new will,
courts allow the circumvention of the legal avenue of relief if the
remedy at law is inadequate. 211 It may be argued that the action
at law is deferred until completion of the probate of the estate.
This, of course, gives rise to the traditional equitable defenses.
The typical cause of action is a claim to impose a constructive
trust.21 2 Quasi-specific performance of the oral contract or joint
agreement is required to avoid the perpetration of an alleged
fraud on the promisee and unjust enrichment of the promisor's
beneficiaries. The prayer in such an action is for enforcement of
the oral will contract by a declaration that the court or the benefi-
ciaries under the new will hold the property as constructive trust-
ees for the plaintiff with a request for distribution.213 Importantly,
210. 183 Cal. App. 2d at 356, 7 Cal. Rptr. 5.
211. 7 B. WrrKnq, SiMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, EQUITY § 3 at 5230-31 (8th ed.
1974).
212. Id. § 28 at 5253. Importantly, the use of this type of cause of action in rela-
tion to creditor's claims tolls the probate "claim" period. Lazar v. Lazar's Estate,
208 Cal. App. 2d 554, 25 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1962).
213. Smith v. Smith, 126 Cal. App. 2d 194, 196-97, 272 P.2d 118, 120 (1954) (action
on oral agreement to leave property to plaintiff in consideration of services to be
rendered and in quantum meruit, instituted against the executor of the estate of
one of the promisors); West v. Stainback, 108 Cal. App. 2d 806, 240 P.2d 366 (1952)
(mother's oral promise to will to the surviving husband of her deceased daughter
her estate upon his reliance by dismissal of various petitions against her made
said oral agreement enforceable through his prior full performance under the stat-
utory rule found in CAL. Civ. PRoc. § 1624 (West 1973); Bonnear v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n., 84 Cal. App. 2d 107, 110-11, 190 P.2d 307, 309-10
(1948) (under property settlement agreement, a divorced husband conveyed realty
to the wife and agreed to make monthly payments to her, but upon her death the
property was sold by a bank acting as executor allegedly in contravention to an
oral agreement as spelled out in a complaint; the bank was successful in interpos-
ing a demurrer to the complaint). The prayer must be carefully written because
the court will closely examine its content. See e.g., Stahmer v. Schley, 96 Cal. App.
3d 200, 96 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1979) (by reason of execution of joint and mutual wills,
and the acceptance by the surviving party of its benefits, the oral agreement evi-
denced by the wills become irrevocable and enforceable against the husband).
both the promisee to the oral will contract and the intended devi-
sees, as third party beneficiaries, may bring the action to enforce
the agreement. 214 It may be wise to seek injunctive relief against
breach in addition to the specific performance. 215 This could be
accomplished in California by invoking the Declaratory Judgment
Act.2 1
6
For the practitioner, the creation of an irrevocable trust might
be the best avenue for preventing a breach during the lifetimes of
both parties. Technically, the surviving party could still breach
the contract, but the wrong would be easy to prove from the exist-
ence of the trust. Trusts capable of amendment, modification, and
alteration would not be effective. An alternative possibility for
those who wish to prevent a false claim of an oral agreement
might be to include a clause in the will such as: "This will repre-
sents the sole evidence of the disposition of the property gov-
erned thereby and expressly overrides any oral agreements that
have been made in the past, present or future."
Various other factors appear to influence courts in their willing-
ness to afford a judicial remedy. The party who sues to enforce
the oral agreement in equity must have performed all of the acts
required under the agreement.2 17 Enforcement of will contracts
214. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 563-64, 2-12 P.2d 878, 881 (1949).
215. Perhaps the standard phrase "all other proper, equitable or legal orders"
would give the court sufficient authority to allow injunctive relief, but one would
best be advised to include a prayer which specifically requests such relief.
216. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1060 (West 1980) states that "[a]ny person inter-
ested under a deed, will or other written instrument, or under a contract, or who
desires a declaration of his rights or duties with respect to another .. " See also
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3384 (West 1970) (relating to specific performance).
217. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3392 (West 1970) states:
Specific performance cannot be enforced in favor of a party who has not
fully and fairly performed all the conditions precedent on his part to the
obligation of the other party, except where his failure to perform is only
partial, and either entirely immaterial; or capable of being fully compen-
sated, in which case specific performance may be compelled, upon full
compensation being made for the default.
Other defenses against enforcement of specific performance are found in CAI. Crv.
CODE § 3390 (West 1970) as follows:
The following obligations cannot be specifically enforced:
1. An obligation to render personal service;
2. An obligation to employ another in personal service;
3. An agreement to perform an act which the party has not power lawfully
to perform when required to do so;
4. An agreement to procure the act or consent of the wife of the con-
tracting party, or of any other third person; or,
5. An agreement, the terms of which are not sufficiently certain to make
the precise act which is to be done clearly ascertainable.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3391 (West 1970) is also important in the oral will contract area.
Under § 3391, specific performance cannot be enforced against any party to a con-
tract in any of the following cases:
1. If he has not received an adequate consideration for the contract;
2. If it is not, as to him, just and reasonable;
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also is more likely if the wills have stood for some time unrevoked
although specific case authority on this point was difficult to lo-
cate.218 Other text writers have pointed out that an oral will con-
tract is not enforceable if the first to die is the first to revoke.219
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article has attempted to trace the trends in the oral will
contract area during the past eighty years into some logical sum-
mary and to evaluate selected points. There is no longer any cer-
tainty that one can successfully argue that purely oral mutual
promises to bequeath property are unenforceable. In an effort to
avoid harsh results case law has developed and relied upon ex-
ceptions that allow oral will contracts to be enforced during the
lifetime of the promisor, or more frequently after his or her
death.220
The drive for a consistent rule by the Owens and Notten courts
planted the seeds that eventually generated a continuous expan-
sion in the enforcement of an oral will contract resting in parol
3. If his assent was obtained by the misrepresentation, concealment, cir-
cumvention, or unfair practices of any party to whom performance would
become due under the contract, or by any promise of such party which
has not been substantially fulfilled; or,
4. If his assent was given under the influence of mistake, misapprehen-
sion, or surprise, except that where the contract provides for compensa-
tion in case of mistake, a mistake within the scope of such provision may
be compensated for, and the contract specifically enforced in other re-
spects, if proper to be so enforced.
Id.
Of course, there is still the common law requirement that the remedy must be mu-
tual, subject to certain exceptions. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3386 (West 1970).
218. See E. ScouRD & E. HALBACK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECENDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 175-76 (2nd ed. 1973).
219. In the landmark case of Stone v. Hoskins L.R.P. 94, 97 (1905) this point was
reflected in dictum:
If two people had made wills which were standing at the death of the first
to die, and the survivor had taken a benefit by that death, the view is per-
fectly well founded that the survivor cannot depart from the arrangement
on his part, because... the will of that part of the arrangement may have
become irrevocable; but that case is entirely different from the present,
where the first to die has not stood by the bargain and her 'mutual' will
has in consequence not become irrevocable. The only object of notice is to
enable the other party to the bargain to alter his or her will also, but the
survivor in the present case is not anyway prejudiced.
Id. (emphasis added).
220. See 35 CAL JuR. 3d Statute of Frauds §§ 89-118 (1977). See also Perillo,
The Statute of Frauds in the Light of Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43
FORDHAm L REV. 39, 42-43 n.29 (1974).
evidence. Estoppel has grown from a relatively secondary doc-
trine to a general remedy applicable to those who could show ade-
quate reliance or unconscionable injury.
As in other areas involving the Statute of Frauds, the decisions
in the oral will contract cases have not avoided the temptation to
expand the exceptions to the point where the exceptions swallow
statute in one gulp.221 The original purpose of the statute has be-
come clouded.
Perhaps the time has come to recognize that the requirement of
a writing for oral will contracts is based on a legal perspective
that is no longer prevalent. At the time of its enactment, the stat-
ute manifested the legal community's apprehension that the flow
of property to the natural objects of a testator's bounty would be
interrupted by the perjured testimony of a faithless servant or
disfavored relative. To avoid such a result, a rule was propounded
that regulated the allocation of a type of property in a class of
cases while leaving no room for the requirements of justice in
particular circumstances involving individual persons. Since the
turn of the century, with the first judicial sidestepping of the leg-
islatively imposed requirement of a writing, the courts have
sought to temper the harshness of the rule in actual cases. Per-
haps contemporary values would be better served by returning to
the approach employed by courts prior to the statute's enactment
in 1905.
The earliest decisions generally enforced these oral agree-
ments.22 2 The existence of the statute has not deterred breaches
by spouses, heirs, and beneficiaries. 223 The pre-1905 solution first
presented in Owens v. McNally224 offers a good test which at least
presented a direct burden on the potential heir to prove up the
case.225 The clear, just, and certain test provides a direct route to
221. Id. See Comment, Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 26 KAN L. REV. 327,
334 (1978). The California Legislature recently abrogated several important hold-
ings of the California Supreme Court in the vehicular guest statute area. The leg-
islature went so far as to actually cite the Supreme court holdings. See CAL. Crv.
CODE. § 1714 (West Supp. 1980).
222. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
223. Cf. Lamborn v. Watson, 6 H. & J. 252, 255, 14 Am. Dec. 275 (Md. 1824) (stat-
ute generates as many frauds as it prevents).
224. 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710 (1896).
225. See notes 68-72 and accompanying text supra. There is a great propensity
for the legislature's wording to be given a broad interpretation leading to unfor-
seen consequences. See e.g., People v. Colver, 107 Cal. App. 3d 277, 105 Cal. Rptr.
614 (1980) (author was attorney for defendant and definition of "proponent" given
overbroad meaning by the trial court causing reversal on appeal). See also
Bouret, The California Going and Coming Rule: A Plea for Legislative Clarifica-
tion, 15 CAL. W. L. REV. 116 (1979) (overbroad nature of CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600
(West Supp. 1980) causes disproportionate results in the courts in the Workers'
Compensation area).
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the truth and was effectively applied in cases such as Monsen.226
Therefore it is recommended that the existence of section 1624(6)
be reevaluated. Its effect seems more often to rob from one party
and give to another under the guise of broad exceptions. The is-
sue of the actual existence of the oral will agreement is too easily
subordinated to the pursuit of a reason to bar the application of
the Statute of Frauds.
The judiciary has been willing to adjust to changing perceptions
of justice by discarding long held rules in favor of fresh ap-
proaches, as has recently been done in the area of parent-child
immunity.227 Judicial rejection of the old rule took place when
the vitality of the rule had been sapped by exceptions. 228 The leg-
islature ought to be as willing to recognize that the rule has out-
lived its usefulness, and to permit, in a straight forward manner,
the disposition of property in accordance with the true wishes of
226. See notes 67-71 supra. There are many different factual twists that can
arise in these types of cases. For example, the will can be probated in a state that
is not the state where the beneficiaries live or the property is located. In other
cases, there are many subsequent wills written, rescinding a mutual or joint will.
Frequently, a will cannot even be found or has long since been destroyed. Often
there is an oral understanding with the only possible writing consisting of a letter
from the promisor to the promisee or to the beneficiaries.
The Statute of Limitations can frequently be a problem in many types of cases,
but no cases could be found concerning the oral will contract area. The issue
could arise as to when the Statute of Limitations starts to run. Does it begin when
the will is changed? When the first spouse dies and the second changes his or her
will? When any party has knowledge? When the second spouse dies? When the
probate is closed? The Statute of Limitations in California for an oral contract is
two years. See CAt. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 339 (West Supp. 1980).
It is interesting to note that the surviving spouse can use gifts as a way of dis-
sipating the estate during their remaining lifetime. This could easily be inter-
preted as a breach by the surviving beneficiaries who were supposed to take the
remaining property. Sheridan, The Floating Trust: Mutual Wills, 15 ALBERTA L.
REV. 211, 213, 230-40 (1977) (the author discusses floating trusts in the framework
of mutual wills, restrictions on both parties are identified and their subsequent
powers of disposition, revocation and the encumbent trust relationship is deline-
ated). It changes the outcome a great deal if the first spouse makes the gift before
death, or the second spouse makes the gift after the first has died. If it is the first,
then query whether this is a substantial breach entitling the remaining party after
the first party's death to no longer honor the oral contract.
227. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). "We
have concluded that parental immunity has become a legal anachronism, riddled
with exceptions and seriously undermined by recent decisions of this Court." Id.
at 915-16, 479 P.2d at 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288. See generally Comment, Negligent
Parental Supervision as Grounds for Contribution in Tort: The Case for Minimal
Parental Liability, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 828, 830-35 (1979).
228. 3 Cal. 3d at 918, 479 P.2d at 649, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
a testator.229
229. Naturally, California lawyers have pursued the most advantageous argu-
ments and championed the exceptions to the Statute of Frauds. Ironically, it
would seem that the draftsmen of the Statute would probably observe that it has
not completely satisfied its original purpose. Without a reevaluation of the rea-
sons for the existence of the statute and a movement to consider its removal, we
can only expect the status quo to continue.
It is hoped that this summary and evaluation has shed enough light to bring
about change in the law surrounding agreements to bequeath or make provision
by will. The criteria for enforcement of oral will contracts in California must be
brought back to the basics. Courts must take their consideration outside of the
ambit of § 1624(6) into the limelight of a clear and just test.
